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Article 6

EQUITY AND THE ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT
Courts of equity have consistently failed to enforce antenuptial agreements
made in anticipation of a marriage between a Roman Catholic and one not of
that faith in a Roman Catholic ceremony. Before the Church, will recognize such
a marriage, the non-Catholic party must agree in writing (1) to raise all children
emanating from the marriage according to the dictates of the Church, and (2) not
to interfere with the practice of Catholicism by the other members of the family.
Before signing this agreement, the non-Catholic party is fully informed as to its
contents and meaning, and voluntarily assumes the obligations set forth. Absent
this agreement, the parties would not be permitted to be married in the Church,
and the Catholic party would be, according to his religion, living a life of sin.
It is an obvious conclusion that such an agreement is a most solemn one since
it is not a promise to man alone, but also to God. Some writers, however, in
sounding the opinions of some courts have given little or no value to such agreements:
No mere agreement as to the religious education of children between
father and mother before or after marriage is binding .

.

. it is his [the

parent's] privilege to inculcate upon his children those religious principles which for the time seem to him best.'
The mere agreement forms part of a very strong contract according to Catholic thought, for, "In marrying, a man and a woman voluntarily enter into perpetual society; if this agreement is valid, neither the contracting parties nor any
other legal body, can dissolve the contract."3 There seems to be little dispute that
the antenuptial agreement is a valid contract. Antenuptial agreements generally
have been upheld by the courts, and enforced according to the intention of the
parties.4 But is marriage of sufficient consideration in exchange for the promise
of the non-Catholic? Mr. Williston answers: "Marriage is regarded by the law as
a valuable consideration and marriage or promise of marriage is sufficient consideration for a promise."5 Proceeding on this basis then, the question is: Why
have courts of equity refused to specifically enforce antenuptial contracts between
parties to a mixed' marriage?
In 1910 the St. Louis Court of Appeals gave three reasons for deciding that
an antenuptial contract providing that an offspring should be brought up in the
Catholic faith even if the Catholic member of the mixed marriage should die was
' The word Church, as used here, refers to the Roman Catholic Church.
2 Friedman, The Parental Right to Control the Religious Education of a Child, 29 Har.
L. Rev. 492 (1916).
8 BOURKE, ETHIcs, A TEXTBOOK IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1951).
4 Strebler v. Wolf, 152 Misc. 589, 273 N.Y. Supp. 653 (1934), Johnston v. Spicer,
107 N.Y. 185, 13 N.E. 753 (1887).

§ 110 (Rev. ed. 1936).
6A "mixed marriage" refers to a marriage between a Catholic and a non-Catholic.
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unenforcible in equity: (1) No property rights are involved in such a contract
for equity to specifically enforce; (2) Only a moral duty is involved; (3) The
welfare of the infant cannot be determined on religious considerations.7
The archaic maxim, "Equity protects only property rights," seems to be in
almost universal disfavor; and, though the maxim still retains some force, writers
recommend that it be abandoned." Equity courts, struggling under the maxim,
have extended their jurisdiction from real and personal property to far more intangible interests. With this constant evolution, the first reason given by the
court for its decision in Brewer v. Cary1" seems inconclusive.
There are several obvious objections to the second reason advanced by the
court above. It has already been established that there exists a valid, written contract prior to the mixed marriage. The only objection to bringing an action at
law on a strict breach of contract basis is the obvious lack of an adequate remedy.
If money damages could be paid in order for the Catholic party to be brought
back into the good graces of his church, there would be no problem. There is,
however, a grave moral duty involved in such an agreement. Nevertheless, the
non-Catholic party, in not performing in accordance with the promise made, has
committed only a simple breach of contract. If there is any remedy, it must be
had in equity. The Catholic party is bargaining for his spiritual existence in an
antenuptial agreement. This grave sanction is pointed up in Ramon v. Ramon:'1
He [the Catholic party] had the right to choose for a spouse one who, though
not a Catholic, would at least agree not to interfere in the exercise by him of
his solemn religious duties, the most important of which would be to see that
his children were brought up in the Catholic Faith, and to see that they would
attend Mass, to partake of the Sacraments, and to faithfully undertake and discharge all of the catholic duties, inseparable in a Catholic home. For it is
important to note that it was only by a concurrence with these obligations that
the respondent's membership in the Catholic Church could he insured and
continued. (Emphasis added).

Thus it can be seen that the antenuptial contract is the most important contract
ever made by the Catholic participant in a mixed marriage. Has not the Catholic
a right to have protected the very reason for his existence?
The third reason given in the Brewer case is the overriding basis for the
weight of authority at the present time; namely, the welfare of the child is the
primary consideration to which all other questions must yield. Thus, in Butchers
case, the court felt that it must consider spiritual and temporal welfare, further
training, education, morals and the ability of the proposed guardian to take care
of the child. 12 And in a recent Maine decision, Dumais v. Dumais,'8 the court
said, "The welfare of the child is the controlling fact in determining care and
custody." The welfare of the child, then, is the label attached to the mechanism
used by the equity courts in failing to enforce prenuptial agreements. In order
to achieve this objective, i.e., the welfare of the child, the courts have seen fit to
7

Brewer v. Cary, 148 Mo. App. 193, 127 S.W. 685
Note, 37 IowA L. REv. 268 (1952).
9 Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 34 Harv. L. Rev.
1'Brewer v. Cary, 148 Mo. App. 193, 127 S.W. 685
1 Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
12 In Re Butcher's Estate, 266 Pa. 479, 109 At. 683
8

(1910).
388 (1921).
(1910).
1942).
(1920).

delve into the conduct of the non-Catholic party in order to determine whether
or not that party's conduct was unconscionable. In Boerger v. Boerger,'14 a wife,
after not only agreeing to the terms of the prenuptial agreement, but taking a
much greater step in converting to Catholicism, decided to return to her original
religious preference because the Catholic religion was ". . . too demanding and
rigorous." The court felt that such conduct was not unconscionable. In Denton v.
James, 5 the court felt that in a dispute relating to custody religious views afford
no ground for depriving a parent of custody who is otherwise qualified.
Thus, it appears that after making a solemn promise in exchange for the
valid consideration of marriage, the non-Catholic party can then renounce this
promise and be awarded the custody of the children to the mixed marriage, having
the right to raise these children in accordance with a new belief. Is not this unconscionable conduct which should evoke the power of equity? Further, the nonCatholic party is well informed of the gravity of the promise and duty which
he undertakes. The non-Catholic party signs before a minister of God, normally
in a place reserved for spiritual matters, and also in the presence of the Catholic
member of the partnership who, as the non-Catholic knows, would not have gone
through with the proposed marriage without a seemingly sincere and valid agreement in accordance with the demands of his religion. Subsequently, the nonCatholic party repudiates this contract upon which the Catholic party has wagered
his whole future. Is this not such unconscionable conduct that the powers of equity
courts are called forth to prevent irreparable injury to the Catholic party? Indeed,
unconscionable seems to be too mild a word; such affairs smack of fraud and
deceit. If the breach of a simple monetary transaction based upon a valid contact
is deemed unconscionable by the equity courts so as to be specifically enforceable
when it threatens irreparable injury, how can these same courts declare that the
breach of a valid prenuptial contract, upon which the very existence of one of
the parties may depend, is not unconscionable nor specifically enforceable? Nevertheless, the courts have consistently failed to enforce such contracts.
Other cases have taken a broader and more reasonable view as to what really
constitutes the ultimate welfare of the child. In Commissioner ex rel Stack v.
Stack,16 the opinion states, "Undoubtedly proper religious training is an important
matter and should be taken into consideration by the courts in determining the
question of custody." A question immediately comes to mind. Should the important
aspect of a child's welfare, religious training, be left to one who would change
religions as often as husbands? While it is true that the courts have seen fit not
to delve into spiritual matters in order to maintain the free exercise of religion,
and that this attitude of the courts toward religion has resulted in the concept
that all religions are equal, still, in the Catholic mixed-marriage contract, the
Catholic insists upon the superiority of his religion over any other, at least as far
18Dumais v. Dumais, 122 A.2d 322 (Maine 1956).
1"Boerger v. Boerger, 26 N.J.Super. 90, 97 A.2d 419 (1953).
15 Denton v. James, 107 Kan. 729, 193 Pac. 307 (1920).
16 Com. ex rel Stack v. Stack, 141 Pa. Super. 147, 15 A.2d 76 (1940).

as the rearing of any children is concerned. This bent of the Catholic's mind is
neither prejudice nor intolerance but, rather, the quite proper regard that a man
of any religion places upon that religion.
The antithesis, then, in suits over prenuptial agreements, is between a party
who believes deeply in the truths of his own religion and who is insisting on the
performance of a solemn promise in regard to these religious beliefs and a nonCatholic party who has changed his mind and has decided either to revert to his
old religious belief or to cull out a novel one from the appeal that it manifests at
this particular time and, in addition, to repudiate the terms of a solemn contract
voluntarily entered upon. It might be wondered whether the latter party is capable
of prescribing the religious practices of children.
The failure of equity in regard to prenuptial agreements is probably a combination of historical accident and failure to comprehend the true nature of the
problem. An analysis of historical accident in this regard is little more than the
vindication of the obvious, arising out of the somewhat battered notion that
equity will enforce only property rights. As to the latter point much has already
been said. Perhaps as clear and concise a statement as possible is contained in
Shearer v. Shearer,7 where it was said that:
The question [of the religious upbringing of the children] was recognized of
such extraordinary importance that a prenuptial agreement was entered into
It is a matter of such dignity and structure that, where the parents cannot agree, the court has the duty of stepping into the breach.

As to the controlling basis, the welfare of the children, the same court states:'$
I see no danger to their physical, mental or spiritual welfare in upholding
the agreement as to their religious upbringing.

Resorting to fundamentals, the opinion states:"
I am firmly of the opinion that the agreement relating to the religious training of the children . . . was an inducing cause of this marriage and is an
enforceable contract which, in and of itself, should he upheld. (Emphasis
added.)

We come, once again, to the Dumais case,20 a 1956 Maine decision. The
welfare argument is the thread winding its way through the case law, and the
Dumais case adds another stitch or two. It says nothing new; it comprehends no
more; it is cognizant of nothing more. This case interestingly compares with a
1918 Pennsylvania decision in which the court felt that the father had broken
his prenuptial agreement, but it refused to enforce the agreement, both parents
having died and the suit having been brought years later by a volunteer, because
the children had become solidified in another religion. 21 The reasonability of that
decision is far more apparent than in the Dumais case.
The maxims of equity, say some scribes, are obsolete and inaccurate. But let
equity keep one maxim-Equity is a Court of Conscience. Let equity, then, look
to the essence of the prenuptial contract, to the true nature of the agreement, and
17 Shearer v. Shearer, 73 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
18Id.

at 359.

19 Id. at 359.
20
Dumais v. Dumais, 122 A.2d 322 (Maine 1956).
21
Com. v. McClelland, 70 Pa. Super. 273 (1918).

to the essential requirement of a child's welfare. Let equity look to these things,
and then determine whether or not prenuptial agreements ought to be enforced.
JOHN E. MURRAY,

JR.

RECENT CASES

CONFLICT OF LAWS-MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE--COURT MAY CHARGE FORMER HUSBAND'S ESTATE FOR WIFE'S MAINTENANCE IN SPITE OF EARLIER EX
PARTE DECREE IN ANOTHER STATE ON HUSBAND'S SUIT FOR DIVORCE-Plaintiff

and defendant were married in Connecticut in 1948. Shortly after the marriage,
they set up domicile in California where they resided until 1952, at which time
they separated. Defendant returned to Nevada where he had been previously
domiciled and procured a decree of absolute divorce. This decree was ex parte,
the plaintiff not making an appearance or answer. Ten months later, the plantiff,
who had during this time taken up residence in New York, brought an action for

separation and maintenance serving the defendant by publication. By order of the
court, the defendant's assets in the State of New York were seized and placed in

the hands of a receiver. The defendant appeared specially to challenge the jurisdiction of the court. Held: Although the court was obliged to give full faith and
credit to the Nevada decree, it was unenforceable insofar as it attempted to determine the property rights of the wife. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 N.Y.2d 342, 135
N.E.2d 553 (1956), cert. granted, 352 U.S. 820 (1956).
It is well settled that a sister state can be required to give full faith and
credit to an ex parte divorce decree obtained in another state so long as the party
obtaining the divorce is properly a domiciliary of the state granting the divorce.
Williams v. North Carolina,317 U.S. 287 (1942); see Gray v. Gray, 320 Mich. 49,
30 N.W.2d 426 (1948), Rice v. Rice, 134 Conn. 440, 58 A.2d 523 (1948), Marshall v. Marshall, 69 Cal. App.2d 20, 157 P.2d 854 (1945), Evans v. Evans, 149
F.2d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 738 (1945), Marchman v.
Marchman, 198 Ga. 739, 32 S.E.2d 790 (1945), Koscove v. Koscove, 113 Colo.
317, 156 P.2d 696 (1945). Whether this means that full faith and credit must
be given to the foreign decree in its entirety or only to the extent that it adjudicates the marital res and marital status of the parties is the subject of much dispute. It has been argued by some that because of the holding in the Pennoyer case
[Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)], the wife may bring an action for maintenance or support when the divorce decree was obtained without personal service
upon the wife. This reasoning has led the courts to apply the concept of "divisible
divorce." See Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1287 (1951).
The doctrine of "divisible divorce" was invoked by the Court in the Estin
case [Estin v. Estin, 334 US. 541 (1948)] and applied to a factual situation much
like the one in the instant case. An action had been brought by the wife for
maintenance, and, subsequent to this, the husband obtained an ex parte divorce

